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Shafae: Expectation of Privacy in Rental Cars

NOTE
UNITED STATES v. THOMAS

NINTH CIRCUIT MIS UNDER"STANDING":
WHY PERMISSION TO DRIVE SHOULD
NOT BE NECESSARY TO CREATE AN
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN A
RENTAL CAR
INTRODUCTION

For many people living in large cities, hourly rental cars are fast
becoming a cost-effective alternative to owning a car. I Similarly, many
college campuses are partnering with hourly car rental services to
provide college students with cheap, convenient transportation. 2 An

I See, e.g., Steven Ginsberg, More Area Car Owners Shift to Hourly Rentals, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 29, 2005, at AOl; Michael Cabanatuan, Car-sharing catching on with Bay Area drivers,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 22, 2007, at A-I; Jim Hopkins, Tired of Costs, Hassles, Some City
Dwellers Try Car-Sharing, USA TODAY, Sep. 15,2005, at B4; Ian Hardy, Re-thinking Urban Car
Journeys,
BBC
NEWS,
Apr.
IS,
2005,
http://news.bbc.co.ukJ2/hi/programmeslcJick_onlinel4446271.stm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
2 See,
e.g.,
UCLA
Car
Share,
http://www.transportation.ucJa.edu!studentslcommutinglrideshareiflexcar!index.htm
(describing
hourly car rental plans for UCLA students) (last visited Mar. 26. 2007); Zipcar for Universities,
http://www.zipcar.comluniversitiesl (explaining partnership programs with universities) (last visited
Mar. 26, 2007).
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hourly car rental, or car sharing, typically involves renting a car for a few
hours to run errands or for trips to the suburbs, where public
transportation may be difficult to use. 3 Cars are parked in lots spread
throughout a city in various neighborhoods. 4 Oftentimes, customers
reserve the car by phone or online and pick up the car without interacting
with a rental agent. 5
However, car-sharing flexibility raises critical legal issues with
respect to a driver's ability to challenge a governmental search of the
rental vehicle. If a multiple-person household had several small errands
to run, the household may rent one car under one person's name and split
the use of the car amongst the various members of the household. For
example, in the college setting, a group of roommates may alternate
using the car to accomplish their household errands. Likewise, a
husband and wife may have to alternate using the same car share vehicle
to pick up children and to shop for groceries. Importantly, different
jurisdictions interpret a person's Fourth Amendment right to challenge
unreasonable government searches using a variety of legal standards. 6
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Thomas, adopted a rule concluding that unauthorized drivers 7 of a rental
car lack a legitimate expectation of privacy unless they can show they
had permission to drive the rented vehicle. 8 The Thomas court held that
the defendant, who was engaged in drug trafficking using rental cars, did
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge a search of the
vehicle because he could not show that he was given permission to drive
the rental car. 9 Although this rule may have functioned well in order to
bring a drug trafficker to justice in Thomas, it risks being short-sighted
by not anticipating the growing possibility of unauthorized drivers of a
car sharing vehicle who may lack a showing of permission. 1O Thomas
involved a traditional rental car, not a car share, but it is not difficult to
imagine a similar situation involving a car share. The Ninth Circuit's
permission rule applies to all rental cars and this issue may have to be
3 See Jim Hopkins, Tired of Costs, Hassles, Some City Dwellers Try Car·Sharing, USA
TODAY, Sep. 15,2005, at B4.
4 [d.

5

[d.

See infra notes 95- I 02 and accompanying text.
For purposes of this Note, an "unauthorized driver" of a rental car is one who is not listed
on the rental agreement and lacks any other form of explicit authority to drive the car.
8 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
9 1d.
6

7

10 Michael Cabanatuan, Car-sharing catching on with Bay Area drivers, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Jan. 22, 2007, at A-I (recounting how multiple users may use the car during one rental
period).
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revisited in the event of a car-sharing situation.
This Note argues that the proper inquiry for determining whether a
defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a rental vehicle
when that defendant is the unauthorized driver of a rental car is the
totality-of-the-circumstances test, not the permission test adopted by the
Ninth Circuit. A test requiring permission is unsupported by Supreme
Court precedent and will yield inconsistent results when applied. Part I
provides a brief historical background for challenges to Fourth
Amendment searches. II Part II sets forth the background and analysis of
the opinion in focus, United States v. Thomas. 12 Part ill evaluates the
court's analysis in Thomas.13 Finally, Part IV concludes that the proper
test for standing is the totality-of-the-circumstances test. 14
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFENDANT'S ABll...ITY TO CHALLENGE A
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH

The Fourth Amendment protects the people from unreasonable
searches and seizures of their persons or property. 15 A person may assert
his or her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable government
intrusion by way of the doctrine of standing. 16
A.

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE BIRTH OF STANDING

Mter the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule, courts
began creating standards to control who may challenge government
searches. 17 This early version of standing was very broad by today's
standards and allowed any defendant who could prove an ownership or
See infra notes 15-102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103-138 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 139-167 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[tlhe right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." /d.
16 The Supreme Court dispensed with the term "standing" for purposes of challenging a
Fourth Amendment search. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978) (dispensing with
"standing" as an analytic element of a Fourth Amendment case). However, courts have been
reiuctant to relinquish the term "standing" as a convenient label to describe a defendant's right to
challenge a search. See United States v. Bouffard, 917 F.2d 673,675 (I st Cir. 1990). This Note will
freely interchange the word "standing" with the phrase "legitimate expectation of privacy."
17 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (adopting the exclusionary rule
whereby the exclusion of evidence was used as a deterrent for illegal government searches and
seizures), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
II

12
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possessory interest in the property being seized, or a substantial
possessory interest in the premises searched, to challenge the search or
seizure. 18 However, lower courts reluctantly excluded evidence by
applying narrow definitions of standing. 19
In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court broadened the thenexisting standing doctrine. 2o The Court extended standing to defendants
who not only showed a possessory or ownership interest in the place or
property searched, but also to those defendants who were "legitimately
on the premises.,,21 The defendant in Jones challenged the admissibility
of drugs seized during a search of his friend's apartment. 22 The
defendant was able to show that he was legitimately on the premises
because his friend gave him a key to the apartment, he stored a suit there,
and he had stayed at the apartment for one night. 23 The Jones Court
emphasized that constitutional safeguards, and not distinctions in
property law, should control for purposes of determining a defendant's
standing to challenge a search.24
As an alternative to a defendant being "legitimately on the
premises," the Jones Court also allowed defendants to have "automatic
standing" when being charged with a possessory crime. 25 Before
automatic standing, defendants were first required to claim possession of
any contraband in order to challenge the search and seizure of that same
contraband. 26 The defendant's claim of possession could then be used as
an admission in the subsequent prosecution of the possessory crime. 27
Thus, the Court reasoned, automatic standing in circumstances of
possession crimes would avoid this self-incrimination dilemma. 28
Mter Jones, the Court shifted away from a standing analysis based
18 See, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d 498,501 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding that only
defendants who claim ownership or right of possession of premises searched or property seized may
object to Fourth Amendment violations).
19 See David A. MacDonald, Jr., Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures; A Small
Group of States Chart Their Own Course, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 559, 562 (1990).
20 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83 (1980); see also infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing SalvuccI).
21 Jones, 362 U.S. at 267.
22 Id. at 259.
23 Id. at 267.
24 See id. at 266 ("Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee' and
'guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures
ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards.").
25 See id. at 263-64.
But see United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1980)
(overruling "automatic standing" from Jones).
26 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 263-64 (1960).
27
1d.
28
1d.
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on property concepts. 29
Instead, the inquiry was focused on a
defendant's "reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion.,,30 By the early 1970s, defendants had four ways to assert
standing: (1) the defendant met the requirements of automatic standing;
(2) the defendant had a possessory or property interest in the place
searched or the item seized; (3) the defendant was legitimately on the
premises at the time of the search; or (4) the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion?' The Court's four
tests survived until the seminal case of Rakas v. Illinois. 32
B.

RAKAS AND THE NARROWING VIEW OF STANDING

In 1978, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision that remains
the benchmark for the Court's standing analysis. 33 Rakas overruled the
"legitimately on the premises" test from Jones and shifted the standing
inquiry from whether a defendant has an expectation of freedom from
government intrusion to whether the defendant has an expectation of
privacy in general. 34 The Rakas Court held that a defendant can
challenge a search only by showing a "legitimate expectation of privacy"
in the area or property searched. 35
In Rakas, the police stopped a car and asked all the occupants to exit
the vehicle. 36 The defendants were passengers in the car. 37 During a
search of the vehicle, the police found a sawed-off rifle under a car seat
and some shotgun shells in the glove compartment. 38 The defendants
asserted no possessory or ownership interest in the weapon or the

29 See David A. MacDonald, Jr., Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures: A Small
Group of States Chart Their Own Course, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 559, 564 n.43 (1990) (rejecting
concerns with invasions of property rights and focusing instead on invasions of privacy
expectations) (internal citations omitted).
30 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
31 See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223,229 (1973) (referring to standing principles as
including traditional test and Jones test).
32 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
33 See id.
34 See generally id.
35 [d. at 143 n.12 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring». Essentially, the Rakas court adopted the Fourth Amendment inquiry from Katz in
order to determine whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy. [d. This inquiry is a
two·pronged test, under which it is first determined whether a defendant has a subjective expectation
of pri vacy in the property being searched, and second, whether society is willing to recognize that
expectation of privacy. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
36 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 (1978).
37 See id.
38 See id.
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ammunition. 39 Instead, the defendants proffered two theories for
challenging the search: (1) the "target theory" that the police targeted
them in the search; and (2) the "legitimately on the premises" theory.40
The Rakas Court held that the defendants lacked standing to
challenge the search.41 The Court rejected both the "target" and the
"legitimately on the premises" theories proffered by the defendants. 42
The phrase "legitimately on the premises" coined in Jones created "too
broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights. 43 The
Court held that the only way to determine standing was to determine
whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
property being searched. 44 The defendants had no legitimate expectation
of privacy because they did not assert a possessory interest in the
property searched and because mere passengers do not have an
expectation of privacy in the glove compartment of a car or under a car's
seat. 45 The Court reasoned that an expectation of privacy is legitimate
when, at the very least, the defendants have a right to exclude others. 46
The defendants in Rakas made no such showing with respect to the glove
compartment and beneath the seat of the car.47

See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,130-31 (1978).
See id. at 133. Only the second theory would have been persuasive under the Jones
decision. [d. at 135 n.4. "Had the Court intended to adopt the target theory now put forth by
petitioners, neither of the above two holdings would have been necessary since Jones was the
'target' of the police search in that case." [d. The defendants did not claim a possessory interest in
the seized property so the issues regarding showing a possessory interest and automatic standing
were not addressed in this opinion. [d.
41 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
42 See id. at 135, 143. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, also stated that the
deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule are not served if society allows defendants whose
personal rights had not been violated to challenge a search. [d. at 137.
43 [d. at 135, 142. Specifically, in Rakas, the Court held that legitimate expectations of
privacy "must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Id.
at 143 n.12.
44 See id. at 143.
45 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
46 See id. at 143 n.l2 (internal citations omitted).
One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others ... and one who
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate
expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude. Expectations of privacy protected
by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in real or
personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest. These ideas were rejected both in
Jones . .. and Katz[.] But by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts
in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.
Id.
47 See id. at 148.
39

40
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The Court distinguished the facts in Rakas from those in Jones. 48
The Rakas Court acknowledged that the defendant in Jones was granted
standing because he was "legitimately on the premises" and not because
of an expectation of privacy.49 Nonetheless, the Rakas Court reasoned
that Jones would have had a legitimate expectation of privacy based on
the facts in that case. 50 Additionally, the Court explained that, although
cars are treated differently from other locations for Fourth Amendment
purposes, the Court's decision in Rakas was not based on such
differences. 51
C.

POST-RAKAS DECISIONS

After the Court set forth the modern approach for standing in Rakas,
it addressed whether a property or possessory interest in the item seized
was, alone, sufficient to confer standing, and whether the Court should
retain the automatic standing rule it had developed in Jones. 52 In two
cases heard on the same day, the Court overruled the "automatic
standing" doctrine created in Jones and refined a defendant's ability to
challenge a search based on an ownership interest alone. 53
In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the Court decided that an ownership
interest, alone, is insufficient to confer standing upon a defendant. 54 In
Rawlings, police found drugs in a purse owned by the defendant's
friend. 55 Rawlings had permission from his friend to hide the drugs in
the purse, but the Court held that he lacked standing to challenge the
search because the defendant had no right to exclude others from the
purse and had no expectation that the purse would be free from
governmental intrusion. 56
The Court's holding was based on two rationales. First, the
48
49

See id. at 149.
See id.

50 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978) (stating "Jones not only had permission to
use the apartment of his friend, but also had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself
on the day of the search and kept possessions in the apartment").
51 See id. at 148. The Court"was reluctant to recognize a difference between an automobile
and dwelling in this situation, with respect to a person's expectation of privacy, because the
defendants' claim here would "fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling place." Id.
52 See David A. MacDonald, Jr., Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures: A Small
Group olStates Chart Their Own Course, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 559, 568 (1990).
53 See id. In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98 (1980), the Supreme Court eliminated automatic standing, and standing based on a
possessory interest alone, respectively. See MacDonald, supra note 53, at 568.
54 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980).
55 Id. at 101.
56 Id. at 105.
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defendant only knew the friend for a few days, and thus, had a lower
expectation of privacy in the purse. 57 Second, the Court reasoned that
hiding the drugs in an acquaintance's purse carried a similar privacy
expectation as if the drugs were being placed in plain view. 58 Therefore,
basing a defendant's standing solely on a property interest-that it was in
the possession of a third party, inside a purse-did not create an
expectation of privacy consistent with the Rakas decision. 59
In United States v. Salvucci, the Court dealt with the question
whether defendants charged with possession of stolen mail could
challenge the search of an apartment owned by one defendant's mother,
where the stolen mail was 10cated. 60 The district court granted the
defendants' motion to suppress based on lack of probable cause to issue a
search warrant. 61 The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling pursuant to the automatic standing doctrine from Jones. 62 The
Supreme Court reversed, overruling the automatic standing doctrine for
two reasons. 63 First, the Court concluded that the self-incrimination
dilemma in Jones was no longer a concern. 64 Second, based on the
reasoning in Rawlings, the Court clarified that "legal possession of a
seized good [was] not a proxy for determining whether the owner had a
Fourth Amendment interest," but that "property ownership [was] clearly
a factor.'.65 Essentially, the Court was not convinced that the value of
excluding evidence by way of the automatic standing doctrine to deter
illegal police searches outweighed the public interest in prosecuting
criminals. 66
Following Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci, a defendant's ability to
1d.
58 1d. at 105--06 (stating that "[wlhile petitioner'S ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one
fact to be considered in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that 'arcane' concepts of
property law [the mere fact that the drugs were in a purse as opposed to plain view1 ought to control
the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment").
59 1d. (stating that "[ w lhile petitioner's ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be
considered in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that 'arcane' concepts of property
law ought to control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment").
60 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).
61
1d.
62 1d.
63 Id. at 85-86.
64 ld. at 89-90 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1964)). The Simmons
Court held that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment
grounds, the defendant's testimony cannot be admitted against the defendant, unless the defendant
makes no objection. See MacDonald, supra note 52, at 569-70. The Court did not reach the issue
of using the suppression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes. Id. at 570.
65 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980).
66 See id. at 94.
57
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challenge a search solely depends on the defendant showing a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the property or place searched. 67 However,
federal circuits employ different approaches to analyze a defendant's
expectation of privacy.68 The Ninth Circuit in particular has its own
approach involving joint possessory interests. 69
D.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT JOINT-VENTURE
STANDING

The Ninth Circuit permits a defendant to base standing on a right
that seemingly belongs to a third party.70 A defendant may demonstrate
a legitimate expectation of privacy in a place or property by proving the
existence of joint control and supervision over the place or property
being searched. 71 A defendant must establish either of the following: (1)
ownership of the place or area searched, which gives him or her
"inherent" dominion and control over that place or area, as well as the
right to exclude others; or (2) active joint control with the owner of the
place or area that he or she does not own.72 Ninth Circuit decisions
require defendants to take reasonable precautions in maintaining privacy
over the area being searched. 73 Additionally, the defendant must have a
proprietary interest in the items seized. 74 If established by joint control, a
defendant's proprietary interest may be shown by a formalized
arrangement with another person. 75 However, other circuits have been

67 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980) (holding that property interest in
item seized alone is insufficient to establish standing); Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85 (eliminating
automatic standing); Rakas v Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (rejecting target theory and
legitimately-on-the-premises test).
68 See MacDonald, supra note 52, at 571-81.
69 See Michelle Alexandria Curtis, Ninth Circuit loint Venture Standing: A Joint Possessory
Interest Is Sufficient to Establish Fourth Amendment Standing, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 311,323-30 (1992)
(describing Ninth Circuit joint venture standing). "Joint control" and "joint venrure" are used
interchangeably in this Note.
70 See generally id. at 329-35 (describing Ninth Circuit joint-venture standing and discussing
some criticisms against it).
71 See id. at 323 (1992).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 323 n.lI0.
74 Id.; see generally United States v. Kovac, 795 F.2d 1509 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing and
discussing Ninth Circuit trend toward applying joint-control standing).
75 See Kovac, 795 F.2d at 1510--11 (discussing cases establishing a formal agreement to
support joint-control standing). See. e.g., United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a car he did not own
because he was in possession of the car with the permission of the owner and had a key, thus having
the requisite level of control over the car), cerro denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981); United States v.
Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the defendants had a legitimate expectation
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reluctant to adopt the Ninth Circuit's joint-control doctrine, and the
Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue. 76 In particular, the Ninth
Circuit has explained the joint-control doctrine in four main cases. 77
In United States v. Perez, the Ninth Circuit allowed co-conspirators
following behind an associate's truck to assert standing to challenge a
search of the truck's gas tank. 78 In Perez, the police seized heroin found
in the gas tank of a truck during a border patrol search.79 The defendants
were co-conspirators with the truck driver, following behind in another
vehicle. 80 The Ninth Circuit upheld joint-control standing upon a second
appeal of a district court's denial of standing. 81 Based on the formal
arrangement between the co-conspiring defendants and their joint
supervision of the truck, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendants had
standing to challenge the search of the truck. 82
The Ninth Circuit expanded on Perez by developing standards for
recognizing joint control. 83 United States v. Johns expanded the jointcontrol doctrine to encompass the bailorlbailee relationship.84 In Johns,
a plane piloted by the defendants landed on a remote landing strip and
defendants gave wrapped bales of marijuana to a waiting party of codefendants. 85 After the plane took off from the landing strip, police

of privacy in a truck they did not own because they were closely following and supervising the truck
as it made its journey); United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
because they had a formal arrangement over the vehicle for transportation of contraband, defendants
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in marijuana bales seized from a vehicle they did not own),
rev'd on other grounds, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1465 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant was co-operator of a drug laboratory in his friend's house; he was
exercising "joint control" over the property, and thus had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
house).
76 See Curtis, supra note 69, at 326 (maintaining joint control as "still good law within the
Ninth Circuit").
77 See Kovac, 795 F.2d at 1510-1511 (discussing Portillo, Perez, Johns, and Pollock).
78 United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982). In Perez, the police seized heroin
found in the gas tank of a truck during a border patrol search. The defendants were co-conspirators
with the truck driver, following behind in another vehicle. The Ninth Circuit developed joint-control
standing on a second appeal of a district court's denial of standing. Id.; see also United States v.
Perez, 644 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1981) (remanding case for standing purposes). Perez was appealed
twice on standing grounds. Compare United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1981), with
United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982).
79 United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1337 (9th Cir. 1982).
80 Id.
81 1d. at 1337-1338.
82 1d. at 1338.
83 See United States v. Kovac, 795 F.2d 1509 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Johns,
707 F.2d 1092, 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1983».
84 See Kovac, 795 F.2d at 1511 (citing Johns, 707 F.2d at \095, 1100).
85 United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d \092, 1095, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1983).
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arrested the receiving parties and seized the rnarijuana. 86 The court
granted the pilots standing to challenge the seizure of the bales based on
the legitimate expectation of privacy formed by the pilots' prior
arrangement with the receiving party and the steps that the pilots took to
maintain privacy of the marijuana by wrapping the bales in opaque
plastic. 87
The Ninth Circuit afftrmed yet narrowed this approach in United
States v. Pollock. 88 Pollock limited the broad interpretation of jointcontrol standing in Johns to require a defendant to demonstrate that his
or her own Fourth Amendment rights were infringed in order to
challenge a search or seizure. 89 Pollock involved co-defendants running
a methamphetamine lab where the defendants would frequently change
the location of the lab to avoid detection. 9o The defendants established
joint-control standing by showing joint supervision over the lab, and by
showing an active maintenance of privacy by frequently changing the
lab's location. 91 Thus, the court granted the defendants joint-control
standing to challenge the police search of the lab. 92
The joint-control doctrine, unique to the Ninth Circuit, can be
controversia1. 93 However, a court may still employ the totality-of-thecircumstances test adopted in Rakas and be consistent with the jointcontrol doctrine. 94
E.

THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT FOR AN UNAUTHORIZED DRNER OF A
RENTAL CAR TO CHALLENGE A SEARCH

Unauthorized drivers of rental cars confront a three-way circuit split
when determining whether they will be granted standing to challenge a
search of a rental vehicle. 95 The ftrst approach is used in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. 96 This approach is a bright-line test whereby
86
87

ld.
ld.

United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1984).
See id.
90 ld. at 1465.
9l
ld.
92
ld.
88

89

See Curtis, supra note 69, at 329-35 (discussing criticisms of the joint-control doctrine).
ld. at 335.
95 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2006).
96 See United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Roper,
918 F.2d 885, 887-88 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Boruff, 909 F.2d III, 117 (5th Cir. 1990).
But see United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 898 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that an
unauthorized driver may have standing to challenge the search of a rental truck if the driver had the
93

94
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an individual who is not listed on a rental agreement lacks standing to
object to a search of the vehic1e. 97 Essentially, an unauthorized driver
will always lack an expectation of privacy due to his or her inherent lack
of a possessory interest by not being listed on the rental agreement. 98
The Sixth Circuit employs a second approach and examines the
totality of circumstances, considering a range of factors. 99 These factors
include the following: (1) whether the defendant had a driver's license,
(2) the relationship between the unauthorized driver and the lessee, (3)
the driver's ability to present rental documents, (4) whether the driver
had the lessee's permission to use the car, and (5) the driver's
relationship with the rental company. 100
Finally, the Eighth Circuit's approach, adopted by the Ninth Circuit
in Thomas, hinges on whether an unauthorized driver had the permission
of an authorized driver to drive the rental car.101 This approach focuses
on the relationship between the authorized and unauthorized drivers and
not on the contractual relationship between the rental car company and
the renter. 102
II.

UNITED STATES V. THOMAS

In United States v. Thomas, the Ninth Circuit decided whether an
unauthorized driver of a rental car had a possessory or ownership interest
in the car so as to establish standing to challenge a search of the

renter's permission). However, subsequent Fifth Circuit cases have followed a bright-line approach
and have noted that Kye Soo Lee "is not controlling ... because it neither reflects nor addresses the
terms of the truck rental agreement." United States v. Seeley, 331 F.3d 471, 472 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003);
see also United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193,205 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The suppression hearing record
does contain evidence that under the rental agreement neither Dortch nor the passenger was an
authorized driver. These facts distinguish the instant case from [Kye Soo Lee.]").
97 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2006).
98 [d. at 1196-97.
99 United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571,586 (6th Cir. 2001).
100

[d.

101

See United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353,355 (8th Cir. 1995).
102 Muhammad, 58 F.3d at 355 (citing United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir.
1991». Sanchez held, for a privately owned car, that a defendant would have standing on a showing
of "a more intimate relationship with the car's owner or a history of regular use of the [car]").
Sanchez, 943 F.2d at 114. "In effect, this approach equates an unauthorized driver of a rental car
with a non-owner driver of a privately owned car." United States v. Thomas,447 F.3d 1191, 1197
(9th Cir. 2006). Cf United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding the
non-owner has standing to challenge a search where he has "permission to use his friend's
automobile and the keys to the ignition and the trunk, with which he could exclude all others, save
his friend, the owner").
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vehicle. 103
A.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

In November 2002, a Spokane, Washington, police officer and Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") task force officer received a tip regarding
defendant Roshon Thomas. 104 The source of the tip told the police that
Thomas had been renting cars to transport crack cocaine between Long
Beach, California, and Spokane, Washington. 105 The source claimed to
have participated in Thomas's drug trafficking operation one to two
years earlier. I06
The police corroborated the source's information, and were able to
confirm that Thomas's associate, McGuffey, rented a car in November
2002 and returned it with 2,889 additional miles on the odometer. 107 The
police also confirmed that the mileage was consistent with a trip from
Long Beach to Spokane and that the source correctly identified the rental
company from which McGuffey rented the car. lOS
On February 27,2003, the Budget Rental Car Company manager at
the Spokane Airport contacted the police to inform them that Thomas
and McGuffey had attempted to rent a car that day.l09 Budget refused to
complete the rental because Thomas and McGuffey had unpaid fees. 110
Accordingly, the Budget manager intended to warn other airport rental
car services about Thomas and McGuffey. III
On March 4, 2003, police learned that National Car Rental had just
issued McGuffey a four-day rental reservation. 112 McGuffey was
scheduled to pick up a white Dodge Intrepid at noon the following
day.113 The police obtained National's consent to install a tracking
device in the Intrepid before McGuffey rented it. 114
The police learned that, based on information from the tracking

103 United States v. Thomas. 447 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that "the question
becomes whether an unauthorized driver has a possessory or ownership interest in the car").
104 ld. at 1193.
105 1d. at 1194.
106
ld.

ld.
losld.

107

United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2006).
[d.
111
1d.
112
1d.
113
1d.
109

110

114 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2006). The police also obtained a
warrant authorizing them to install the tracking device. See id. at 1194 n.2.
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device, the car had arrived in Washington on March 8, 2003, at 1:30
a.m. 115 The police and a DEA agent monitored the freeways until a car
matching the description of the rental car appeared on the freeway. 116
After stopping the car, the DEA agent approached the car and recognized
Thomas from a booking photograph that the police had shown him. 117
There were no other individuals in the car. 118 Thomas presented the
officers with a driver's license bearing the name Roland Phillips.1I9
Based on Thomas's tattoos, officers ascertained Thomas's true identity
and arrested him pursuant to an outstanding warrant. 120
The police then searched the rental vehicle and found, among other
items, nearly 600 grams of cocaine located next to the spare tire in the
vehicle's trunk. 12I The police also found $1,200 and 25.1 grams of
heroin. 122
Thomas moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. 123
The district court concluded that Thomas failed to show that McGuffey
gave him permission to use the car because Thomas had offered no
evidence to support such a conclusion. 124 The district court denied the
motion, reasoning that because an unauthorized driver of a rental car has
no expectation of privacy, Thomas lacked standing to challenge the
search. 125
B.

THE THOMAS COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING

A three-judge panel decided the case, with Judge Diarmuid F.
0' Scannlain writing the opinion. 126 The panel issued the decision

1d. at 1195.
1d.
117
1d.
118
1d.
119 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2006).
120 Id.
115
116

121 1d. The government did not justify the search of the vehicle with Thomas's consent of the
search. Id. at 1195 n.3. Additionally, the possible impropriety of the search of the trunk is not an
issue in this decision. The court never reached the issue on whether the search was proper under the
automobile exception since Thomas was denied standing to challenge the search. Id. at 1199 n.9.
122 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th CiT. 2006).
123
124

ld.
Id.

125 Id. at 1195-96. The district court ruled on a number of other grounds outside the scope of
this note. "[Tlhere was probable cause to issue a search warrant; monitoring public movements was
not a search in the first place; a Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968)] stop was proper under the
circumstances; the automobile exception applied and supported the search; and discovery was
inevitable in any event." Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1196.
126 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006).
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without oral argument. 127
i.

A Possessory or Ownership interest May Be Shown by "Joint
Control" or "Common Authority" Over the Property

The Thomas court followed precedent and interpreted a possessory
or ownership interest broadly to include a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area searched. 128 The court stated that a defendant who
lacks ownership of the property being searched may still have an
expectation of privacy, and thus, standing to challenge a search of that
property.129 Such a defendant may establish standing upon a showing of
"joint control" or "common authority" over the property.13~ As an
example, the court stated that a defendant would have standing to
challenge a search of his or her friend's automobile if the defendant
could show that he or she had permission to use the car, held a key to the
car, and had the "right and ability to exclude others, except the owner,
from the car."l3l The Thomas court drew analogies to situations in which
defendants challenged searches of friends' property to support applying
joint-venture standing in cases of unauthorized drivers of rental cars.132
The government argued that a driver has no legal right to control or
to possess a rental car in contravention of the lease agreement, but the
court found this contention beside the point. 133 The court reasoned that a
privacy interest may exist even if a defendant was in technical violation
of a leasing contract. l34 The court also held that absent affIrmative acts
of repossession by the lessor, the expectation of privacy did not

[d. (citing FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)).
[d. at 1197-98.
129 [d. at 1198.
130 [d.
127

128

131 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that defendant, who borrowed a friend's car,
had standing to challenge a search)).
132 Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198. The court relied on a number of analogous examples of "fiiendof-owner" standing. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259, 265 (1960); see also Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (contrasting Jones with a defendant who could not make a sufficient
showing of standing).
133 United Statesv. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191,1198 (9th Cir. 2006).
134 [d.
The court relied on precedent that focused more on the actual possession of the
property being scaiched as opposed to contractual possession of the propert"i. See United States v.
Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 647 (9th Cir. 2001) (having expectation of privacy in rental car after lease
period expires, as long as lessee retains possession and control over car). The opinion also examined
persuasive precedent from other circuits regarding lease expirations. See e.g., United States v.
Owens, 782 F.2d 146, ISO (lOth Cir. 1986) (holding that a motel guest has an expectation of privacy
after check -out time).
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automatically end when the lease expired. 135
2.

An Unauthorized Driver of a Rental Car May Have Standing to
Challenge a Search With a Showing of Permission From the
Authorized Driver

Mter discussing the circuit split regarding an unauthorized driver's
standing to challenge a search, the Ninth Circuit adopted the rule
employed in the Eighth Circuit. 136 The Thomas Court held that the
Eighth Circuit approach was in accord with prior Ninth Circuit
precedent-that indicia of ownership coupled with possession and
permission from the rightful owner might sufficiently establish
standing. 137 However, the Ninth Circuit denied Thomas standing
because he failed to make a showing that McGuffey had given him
permission to drive the rental car. 138
III. THE PROPER TEST FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A DEFENDANT

HAs A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRNACY Is THE TOTALITYOF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES TEST

To determine whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of
privacy a court should conduct an inquiry gauging a person's relationship
to property and not an inquiry with respect to the person's location.139
The appropriate inquiry must be done on a case-by-case basis,
considering many factors relevant to an individua1' s situation. 14O The
Thomas court, in its expectation-of-privacy inquiry, ultimately adopted a
rule that makes short shrift of the Supreme Court's sensitivity and
meticulousness in determining a defendant's expectation of privacy.

J35 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001). Although the defendant in Dorais was a motel guest
and not a driver of an automobile, the court did not address factual differences between an
expectation of privacy in a room contrasted with an expectation of privacy in a mode of
transportation. See Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198.
136 Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1199.
The Eighth Circuit's approach focuses on whether the
unauthorized driver has permission from the authorized driver to establish a possessory interest in
the rental vehicle. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
137 Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1199 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); United
States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980».
138 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
139 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
140 See id.; see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (holding that visitors to a
residence do not have an expectation of privacy because of the economic reason why they were
there); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980) (analyzing mUltiple factors even though
defendant was owner of property seized).
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THE THOMAS COURT'S FocuS ON PERMISSION IS UNSUPPORTED BY
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

In Thomas, the court adopted the Eighth Circuit's rule allowing an
unauthorized driver of a rental car standing to challenge a search of the
car with a showing of permission to drive the rental car. 141 Essentially,
under that rule, a showing of permission would establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy in a car that the driver does not own.142 The
Thomas court primarily extended its reasoning from United States v.
Portillo to support this conclusion. 143
In Portillo, where two defendants fled a robbery in a car that neither
owned, there was no assertion that a showing of permission was
dispositive for an inquiry into standing to challenge a search.l44 Rather,
the court listed factors supporting a finding of a legitimate expectation of
privacy in property that the defendant did not own. 145 The Portillo
court's standing analysis involved drawing analogies between the
defendants in that case and the defendants in Rakas and Jones. l46 The
Portillo court reasoned that since one of the two defendants was in a
position factually similar to that of the defendants in Rakas, and the other
defendant was in a position similar to that of the defendant in Jones, then
the former defendant had standing and the latter did not. 147 Portillo's
reliance on Jones was merely factual. 148
The Thomas court similarly relied on Jones to draw a factual
analogy to a situation where a non-owner of property was able to
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property. 149
Specifically, the Thomas court noted that Jones "had permission to use
the apartment, had a key to the apartment, stored his belongings there,
and had the right and ability to exclude others, except the owner, from

United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
1d.
143 1d. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) and United States v. Portillo,
633 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980».
144 See United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313,1316-17 (9th Cir. 1980).
145 See id. at 1317 ("Here, [the defendant] had both permission to use his friend's automobile
and the keys to the ignition and the trunk, with which he could exclude all others, save his friend, the
owner. [The defendant], therefore, possesses the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy
necessary to challenge the propriety of the search.").
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257,259,265 (1960».
141

142
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the apartment.,,150 The Thomas court also noted that Portillo held that "a
defendant may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in another's car
if the defendant is in possession of the car, has the permission of the
owner, holds a key to the car, and has the right and ability to exclude
others, except the owner, from the car.,,151 Accordingly, the Thomas
court's reasoning relied upon authority that based its conclusions on
multiple factors akin to a totality-of-the-circumstances test, not on one
dispositive factor like the permission test. 152
To limit the inquiry to one dispositive factor is not in keeping with
either circuit or Supreme Court precedent. 153 The Thomas court
essentially chose to adopt a bright-line rule focused on permission. l54 By
doing so, Thomas revisited concerns that Rakas put to rest. 155 In effect,
Thomas required a showing of permission, much as Jones required a
showing that a defendant was legitimately on the premises. 156 Thomas
reverted the court's standing analysis back to the "legitimately on the
premises" test articulated in Jones-the same analysis that the Supreme
Court overruled twenty-eight years earlier in Rakas. 157
B.

THE PERMISSION TEST YIELDS INCONSISTENT RESULTS

In Thomas, the court found it unnecessary to apply the permission
rule it adopted from the Eighth Circuit because the defendant Thomas
did not proffer any evidence of his permission to drive McGuffey's
rental car. 158 The Thomas court therefore had no opportunity to set forth
proper guidelines for other courts to follow when analyzing a defendant's
permission to drive a rental car. Although this lack of guidance provides
lower courts with considerable flexibility, future defendants risk being
subject to an ad-hoc, arbitrary legal standard.
150
151

Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. at 259, 265).
Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198 (citing United States v. Portillo. 633 F.2d 1313. 1317 (9th CiT.

1980».
152 See generally Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (holding that a number of
factors are taken into account when determining Fourth Amendment standing); United States v.
Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that joint control is the key inquiry for Fourth
Amendment standing for non-owner defendants, listing a number of factors that include permission).
153 See Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1199 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. at 266; Portillo, 633 F.2d at 1317).
154 See Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1197 (comparing the permission test of the Eighth Circuit with
the totality of the circumstances test of the Sixth Circuit).
155 See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
156 Compare United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2006) (seeking a
showing of permission), with Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 136 (1978) (quoting Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 264, 267 (1960».
157 See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
158 United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
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As of January 7, 2007, only one court has cited Thomas in tackling
the permission issue. 159 United States v. Silva involved a driver, fleeing
arrest using a friend's car, who subsequently crashed the car. l60 The
defendant argued standing based on evidence of a longtime friendship
between the driver and the car's owner. 161 Although there was no
structured agreement to use the car, both the owner and the driver
understood that the driver was authorized to use the car. 162 Interestingly,
the decision employed the totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine
permission: 163
Although explicit permission to borrow or use a car is certainly one
method to prove an expectation of privacy, it is not the sole method.
To require long-time friends to state explicitly their understanding,
when their friendship does not require such explicit conversation, is
not required to establish standing. Given the totality of the
circumstances, the court finds that Silva has established a reasonable
. 0 fpnvacy
'
. th e green Hon da. 164
expectatIOn
III
The court reasoned that although there was no explicit showing of
permission, the surrounding factors weighed in favor of implicit
permission. 165 Notwithstanding Silva's inquiry into the defendant's
permission to use the car, the court's approach was much like the
approach proposed by this Note. 166 In light of the Thomas court's lack of
guidance, one can hope that courts continue to employ the Silva
interpretation of Thomas.
In both Eighth Circuit cases cited in support of the permission rule
in Thomas, the defendant in each case presented no evidence to prove
that he had permission to drive the rental car. 167 Therefore, it is still
unclear how courts other than the Silva court will deal with this issue.

159 See United States v. Silva. No. 05-00503-05-JMS. 2006 WL 4007006. at *4 (D. Haw.
Nov. 9, 2006) (holding that a showing of implicit permission is sufficient to establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy).
160 See id. at *1.
161 See id. at *4.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See United States v. Silva, No. 05-00503-05-JMS, 2006 WL 4007006, at *4 (D. Haw.
Nov. 9, 2006).
166 See id.
167 See United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
Best, 135 F.3d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir.
1995)); United States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, 256 (8th Cir. 1994) (defendant testified that he did not
have permission).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Allowing unauthorized drivers of rental cars to assert standing to
challenge a search of a vehicle could potentially become a bigger issue
than it is now. With the growing density of cities and the increasing
costs associated with owning a car, city dwellers may elect to use hourly
car rentals for daily tasks instead of buying cars. 168
The Ninth Circuit adopted a permission rule that flies in the face of
the reasoning behind Rakas. The main concern in Rakas-that the
government violated a defendant's expectation of privacy and not his or
her property rights-is essentially ignored by the permission test adopted
in Thomas. A driver's expectation of privacy should be shown through
factors other than permission. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit hastily
adopted the permission rule without regard for its practical
implications. 169 No case cited by Thomas from the Eighth Circuit
exhibited a process for finding permission. 170 It makes little sense to
pass over the totality-of-the-circumstances test, which ensures that each
defendant is afforded a meticulous analysis of his or her expectation of
privacy, in favor of a more rigid rule that has not been adequately tested.
In order to remain true to core Fourth Amendment principles, courts
must conduct an exhaustive analysis of a defendant's possessory interest
in the searched property. Only through an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances may courts accurately gauge each specific situation. By
adopting a rigid permission rule in Thomas, the Ninth Circuit's standing
jurisprudence has failed to evolve with society'S recognition of an
expectation of privacy as intended by interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment in Rakas.
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